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burden both the property owners and the city. Both had a duty to prevent
fire hazards and to maintain adequate sanitation standards. The ordinance
might have been upheld, then, as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
Furthermore, one of the main purposes of the religious guaranties in the
Constitution was the prevention of religious persecution. 1 1  Although some
restraint was imposed on individual rights, it scarcely seems that there was
a denial of them.
Nevertheless, although individual actions must conform to a certain degree
to the standards set to govern the conduct of society generally,', the
Supreme Court evidently felt that ordinances of this kind were too fraught
with the possibility of destroying personal liberty. By protecting circulation
as well as publication and by including leaflets along with newspapers and
periodicals the instant case is a further extension of the great protection
accorded by the Constitution to the freedom of religion, speech, and the press.
The Court is loathe to recognize a social interest to justify any regulation in
the direction of censorship.13  I. D. B.
MORTGAGES-SuBROGATION--VoLUNTEER.--Plaintiff bank advanced money to
discharge a mortgage on certain land at the request of the mortgagor. Such
land was also subject to a dower charge, subordinate to the mortgage by prior
agreement. A new mortgage was executed to the plaintiff bank, and con-
temporaneous therewith the mortgagor agreed to procure a quitclaim deed
or postponement of the lien of the dower charge in favor of the plaintiff bank.
Subsequent attempts by the mortgagor to perform this agreement were un-
availing. The holders of the dower charge obtained a judgment on their
claim and for the satisfaction of which seek to have the land sold. This is
a suit by the plaintiff bank to restrain such sale, and a prayer that it be
subrogated to the position of the mortgagee whose lien had been discharged
by the plaintiff's .advances. From the lower court's dismissal of the bill,
plaintiff appeals. Held: Affirmed. Subrogation will not be decreed for a mere
volunteer. Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Byers (1939), 100
F. (2d) 82.
Subrogation is said to be a remedial doctrine based on considerations of
equity and good conscience applied broadly, as may best serve the purposes
of natural reason and justice.'
Being a concept of such variable nature, it is obviously futile to attempt a
specific enumeration of the instances wherein the doctrine will be invoked.
However, the restrictions imposed on its applicability admit of being cata-
logued.
There must be a full and complete payment of the debt due the creditor
to whose position the payor seeks to be subrogated.2 One primarily obligated
San Francisco Shopping News Co. v. South San Francisco (1934), 69 F. (2d)
879, writ of certiorari denied in 293 U. S. 606, 55 S. Ct. 122, 79 L. ed. 697.
11 Willis, Constitutional Law, 502.
12 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), 968.
13 Near v. Minnesota (1930), 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625; Grosjean v.
American Press Co. (1936), 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444.
1 Davis v. Schlemmer (1897), 150 Ind. 472, 50 N. E. 373.
2 Vert v. Voss (1881), 74 Ind. 565.
RECENT CASE NOTES
to pay is not entitled to subrogation. 3 Clean hands, 4 absence of laches, 5 and
non-existence of the possibility of prejudice to the rights of intervening innocent
third parties6 are, of course, necessary conditions upon the allowance of
subrogation. The limitation that subrogation will not be accorded one who
has paid the debt of another as a "mere volunteer" 7 and the lack of a definite
connotation of the word "volunteer" always creates uncertainty as to the
outcome of a subrogation case. It may be said generally that the modern
tendency is to limit the conceptual confines of the term to those of the ex-
pression "officious intermeddlers", as used in the field of quasi-contracts.
8
The growth and expansion of the doctrine of subrogation resulting from this
trend to restrict the meaning of the word, "volunteer", impels a caveat against
any acceptance, as being exclusive, of the following enumerated type situations
wherein the courts have held or declined to hold the payor a "mere volunteer".
It is universally recognized that where one pays the debt of another in the
performance of a legal duty imposed by contract or the rules of law,9 or
pays under a practical compulsion of protecting his own interests,1 0 he is not
a volunteer. On the other hand, the law is just as clear that where a stranger
to the obligation pays and such payment was unjustified by the circumstances
under which it occurred, he is a volunteer."1 The intermediate factual set-ups
strike the discordant notes in the cases.
Most courts agree that subrogation should be allowed one whose property
is wrongfully used to discharge a lien.1 2
Where the lender receives new security that proves defective, a majority
of jurisdictions will not invoke the volunteer rule to inhibit subrogation.13
However, where the new security is what it purports to be, and the lender
apparently intended to rely thereon, his rights are confined to the security
3 Dill v. Voss (1883), 94 Ind. 590.
4 Dixon v. Thompson (1912), 52 Ind. App. 560, 98 N. E. 738.
5 Thomas v. Stewart (1888), 117 Ind. 50, 18 N. E. 505, 1 L. R. A. 715.
6 Coonrod v. Kelly (1902), 119 Fed. 841.
7 The principle that "equity will not aid a mere volunteer" has a double
meaning that is sometimes confusing. The meaning it has as applied to situa-
tions other than subrogation cases is that equity will never decree specific
performance of a voluntary undertaking or promise. Jefferys v. Jefferys (1847),
Craig & Ph. 139, 41 Eng. Repr. 443.
8 In this instance, it is of interest to note that the American Law Institute
in its Restatement of Restitution devotes a section to subrogation, (Sec. 162),
treating it as a method of restitution for unjust enrichment. Also see Note
(1913), 26 Harvard L. Rev. 261 and Note (1933), 31 Mich. L. Rev. 826.
9 Jones v. Tincher (1860), 15 Ind. 308. There is a split of authority as
to whether a moral duty to pay entitles the payor to subrogation. See Vance
v. Atherton (1934), 252 Ky. 591, 67 S. W. (2d) 968, allowing subrogation,
and Meier v. Planer (N. J. Equity, 1931), 152 A. 246, denying subrogation.
1 OArnold v. Green (1889), 116 N. Y. 566, 23 N. E. 1. Bacher v. Pyne
(1892), 130 Ind. 288, 30 N. E. 21. The interest which the payor sought
to protect need not be a property interest. Avery v. American Surety Co.
(1930), 146 Misc. 224, 260 N. Y. S. 828. Where one pays mistakenly thinking
that he is protecting his interests, he is entitled to subrogation. Spaulding v.
Harvey (1891), 129 Ind. 106, 28 N. E. 323.
11 Coontoocoak Fire Precinct v. Hopkinton (1902), 71 N. H. 574, 53 A. 797.
12Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Kerr (1917), 220 N. Y. 137, 115 N. E. 465.
13 Shaw v. Meyer-Kiser Bank (1927), 199 Ind. 687, 156 N. E. 552.
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received. 14 At first blush it would appear that the instant case falls under
this qualification. On further reflection, though, it must be presumed that the
plaintiff bank would not have advanced the funds to pay off the prior mort-
gage but for the agreement of the mortgagor to secure the subordination of
the dower charge. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was content
to rely solely on the new security received.
Where one advances money in ignorance of a lien junior to the one for
the discharge of which the money was loaned, the weight of authority will not
apply the volunteer rule to such lender.15 The cases are about evenly divided
as respects allowing subrogation to the lender if he was negligent in not
noting the record of the junior incumbrance. 1 6 It is submitted that those
cases denying subrogation in such a situation are unsound. The junior
lienor's rights are not impaired when he is restored to his original position
and he has no recognizable right to rise upon another's mistake. In the
instant case the lender had actual knowledge of the junior incumbrance when
he advanced the money, so he can not avoid the volunteer rule by having his
case put under this mistake category.
Where one is induced to loan money to discharge a mortgage by the fraud,
duress, undue influence, or other inequitable conduct of the mortgagor, the
better reasoned cases do not designate such person a volunteer.1 7  Could it
not be said with as much validity that a breach of contract by the mortgagor
as in the case under review is such wrongful conduct on the part of the mort-
gagor as to take the lender out of the volunteer class?
The instant case held that where one advances money at the request of the
mortgagor for the purpose of paying off the mortgagee to which the lender
wishes to be subrogated, and it is so applied, such person is a mere volunteer.
The court asserted that subrogation is to be given only to one "who had a
legal or a moral duty to pay." It is submitted that this crystallization of the
principle that subrogation is a doctrine founded in natural reason and justice
to be accorded at the discretion of the court is not compatible with currently
prevailing economic thought. A court that has its judicial ear to the ground of
the modern business man's conception of commercial expediency will often do
violence to established legal principles in order to render decisions favorable
to money lenders, thereby facilitating credit transactions. This court in the
instant case, by according to the holders of the dower charge the windfall of
their becoming first lien holders at the expense of the one who advanced funds
to the mortgagor to prevent his being foreclosed on, seemed to distort estab-
lished legal rules (principles of the law of unjust enrichment) in order to
bite the hand that feeds our commercial machinery.
14 Webber v. Frye (1925), 199 Iowa 448, 202 N. W. 1; Copen v. Garrison
(1906), 193 Mo. 335, 92 S. W. 368.
15 Fowler, Guardian, v. Maus (1894), 141 Ind. 47, 40 N. E. 56.
16 Allowing subrogation-Prestridge v. Lazor (1923), 132 Miss. 168, 95
S. 837; Wilson v. Kimball (1853), 27 N. H. 300; Williams v. Libby (1919).
118 Me. 80, 105 A. 855. Disallowing-Strastny v. Pease (1904), 124 Iowa
587, 100 N. W. 482; Kuhn v. Nat'l Bank (1906), 74 Kans. 456, 87 P. 551.
17 Sidener v. Pavey (1881), 77 Ind. 241; Barnett v. Griffith (1876-), 27
N. J. Eq. 201.
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Fortunately, the decision is only representative of the holdings in a rapidly
decreasing minority of jurisdictions.1 8  J. M. C.
PROMOTERS' CONTRACnS-RATIFICATION.-SUit to recover a commission for
services rendered in the reorganization and refinancing of Indianapolis Blue
Print Co., an Indiana corporation, on the theory that plaintiffs had a contract
with the president of that company which defendant had impliedly adopted
and ratified after its incorporation. The promoters had agreed to plaintiffs'
request for a fee of ten percent of the capital obtained. Plaintiffs also per-
formed the part of the agreement which required them to open a set of books
and establish an accounting system for the new corporation (defendant).
Held. A corporation may make a promoter's contract its own in the same
manner it might itself enter into a contract of a similar nature as one of the
original contracting parties, which presupposes an implied ratification in some
situations. Indianapolis Blue Print and Manufacturing Co. v'. John J. Kennedy
(Ind. 1939), 19 N. E. (2d) 554.
The uniformity with which American courts display liberality in allowing
recovery on promoter's contracts is not reflected in the reasoning upon which
the results have been reached.1 Uniformity in the latter respect extends
no farther than the obvious conclusion that a promoter's contract is not a
corporate obligation of its own force. 2 Liability of the corporation and its
ability to enforce must be based on a charter or statutory provision which has
been properly complied with 3 or on some act of the corporation after it is
18Rachal v. Smith (1900), 101 F. 159; Bigelow v. Scott (1903), 135 Ala.
236, 33 S. 546; Stephenson v. Grant (1925), 168 Ark. 927, 271 S. W. 974;
Olson v. Cornwell (Cal., 1933), 25 P. (2d) 879; Federal Land Bank v. Hanks
(1927), 123 Kans. 329, 254 P. 1040; White v. Newhall (1888), 68 Mich. 641,
36 N. W. 699. For another case representing the minority rule see Vaux v.
Vaux (1934), 115 N. J. Eq. 586, 172 A. 68.
The state of the law in Indiana on this point is unsettled. Several cases
hold that the mere loaning of money to a mortgagor to discharge an incum-
brance without more will not entitle the lender to subrogation. McClure v.
Andrews (1879), 68 Ind. 97; Heiny v. Lontz (1896), 147 Ind. 417, 46 N. E.
465. There is a strong dictum in a recent case that would indicate that
Indiana is in accord with the majority view. Kozanjieff v. Petroff (1939),
19 N. E. (2d) 563. Also see Mishawaka-St. Joseph L. & T. Co. v. Neu (1935),
209 Ind. 433, 196 N. E. 85; Warford v. Hankins (1898), 150 Ind. 489, 50
N. E. 468.
Where there is an agreement for subrogation (called "conventional subro-
gation") with either the creditor, Board of Commissioners of Bartholomew
County v. Jameson (1882), 86 Ind. 154, or the debtor, American Nat'l Bank v.
Holsen (1928), 331 Ill. 662, 163 N. E. 448, subrogation will be allowed not-
withstanding the volunteer character of the payor.
1 See 49 A. L. R. 673 (1927), 17 A. L. R. 452 (1922), Liability of Corpora-
tions on Contracts of Promoter.
2 Since a contract requires two competent parties, and parties are not com-
petent within the meaning of this principle unless they are in being, the
corporation can not contract as such until it has at least a de facto existence.
1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, sec. 205.
3 Gent v. Manufacturers and Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. (1883), 107 Ill. 652,
aff'g. (1883) 13 Ill. App. 308; Hart Potato Growers' Ass'n. v. Greiner (1926),
236 Mich. 638, 211 N. W. 45.
